Companies have been found to report positive information more quickly than they report negative information (i.e., good news early, bad news late). This research investigates the impact of audit opinion change on the timeliness of financial disclosures; with improvements in audit opinion considered to be good news and deteriorations in audit opinion is considered to be bad news. Both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change is considered, with magnitude measuring how far the opinion is from an unqualified opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion with emphasis of matter paragraph is closer to an unqualified opinion than a qualified opinion is). Data of 103 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2013 were used. Findings reveal that firms experiencing an improvement in their audit opinions disclose their financial results earlier, while those with audit opinion deteriorations report their financial results later, and it is also found that the magnitude of audit opinion deterioration is related to delay but there is not significant relationship between the magnitude of audit opinion improvement and timeliness of disclosure.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Board composition and financial leverage of a company in which there is political connection. In this way, multilateral model of Topsis method and weighted multi-criteria model entropy index method is used to measure their political connection. In order to examine the research hypotheses, Regressions model and to estimate the models, Eviews software is applied. In this research, generally 109 companies are considered as samples about which all information is gained through analysis of stock data of Tehran's negotiable instruments organization during an eleven-year period (2001-2012). Findings of this research reveal there is no relationship between Board composition and financial leverage in companies with a great deal of political connection. In addition, there is no relationship between Board composition and financial leverage about companies in which there is little political connection. In fact, the results display that being political does not influence on the relationship between Board composition and financial leverage.

Since the political power ring is not clearly separable from the economic power ring, and the government's political support affects the economic role-making of companies, this study seeks to explore the effect of the political support of the government on the company's cash holding level. In addition, the intervening effect of the agency cost was examined. Political support means extensive relationship with companies and government. Maintaining extensive relationship with government over time leads to satisfaction and political support of the government. The time period of the research is during the years 2003-2012 .The sample consists of 98 companies. The research method is correlational. The "Least squares method" was used in order to test the hypotheses. The results suggest that there is a negative and significant relationship between political support and cash holding level .Furthermore, the effect of political support on the cash holding increases with the rise in agency cost and the negative relationship between political support for companies and cash holding is affected by high agency cost.

The aim of the study is to explore the effect of firm size and quality of disclosure on the cost of common stock. The cost of common stock as dependent variable, quality of disclosure and firm size as independent variables, financial leverage and book value to market value, and systematic risk as control variables have been reviewed. The time span of the study was a ten year course starting from 2003 to 2012, and selected sample consisted of 1090 year-firm. The research method is a correlational descriptive method, and a multivariate regression method was used to test hypothesis. Results indicated that there is a significant negative relationship between firm size and cost of common stock as well as between quality of disclosure and cost of common stock.